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US Landpower in Regional Focus

Strategic Landpower in the Indo-Asia-Pacific
John R. Deni
Abstract: The US Army has a major, strategic role to play in the
Indo-Asia-Pacific theater. That role can be broken down into three
broad areas—bolstering defense of allies and deterring aggression,
promoting regional security and stability through security coopertion, and ameliorating the growing US-China security dilemma.
Employing strategic landpower in each of these areas is not without
challenges—especially in the face of sequestration—yet not making
use of the Army will result in fewer policy options.

I

n the rush to the Indo-Asia-Pacific theater prompted by the January
2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, it has become conventional
wisdom to say the US Army has only a minimal role in the rebalancing effort underway. Advocates of this perspective assume that the
Pacific theater—with its massive distances—is far more suitable to the
platform-intensive Air Force and Navy, than the soldier-centric Army.1
They then argue that, since the Army’s primary mission is fighting and
winning the nation’s wars, the Army’s role in the Pacific is largely limited
to the Korean Peninsula.
The Army is not blameless in this respect. According to one prominent analyst, the Army’s, “organizational culture continues to focus
nearly exclusively on state-on-state war.”2 Organizational bias has also
adversely affected how the institutional Army embraced the importance of promoting interoperability, developing coalition capability,
and building partner capacity.3 And this bias persists despite efforts by
General Ray Odierno, the Army’s Chief of Staff, to change that culture
by emphasizing the importance of shaping the international environment and preventing conflict in the first place, including through the
development of the Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) initiative.4
In fact, the US Army has significant strategic roles to play in the
Indo-Asia-Pacific region that cannot be adequately performed by naval
or air forces. They fall into three broad categories: bolstering defense of
allies and deterring aggression; promoting regional security and stability through security cooperation; and ameliorating the growing United
States–China security dilemma. As discussed below, the United States
1     Jan van Tol , Mark Gunzinger, Andrew Krepinevich, and Jim Thomas, “AirSea Battle: A Point
of Departure Operational Concept, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments,” Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), May 18, 2010, www.csbaonline.org/publications/2010/05/
airsea-battle-concept/; T. X. Hammes, “Offshore Control: A Proposed Strategy for an Unlikely
Conflict,” National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), June 2012, www.ndu.
edu/inss/docuploaded/SF%20278%20Hammes.pdf; Jonathan G. Odom, “What Does a ‘Pivot’ or
‘Rebalance’ Look Like? Elements of the U.S. Strategic Turn Towards Security in the Asia-Pacific
Region and Its Waters,” Asian Pacific Law & Policy Journal 14, no. 1 (December 31, 2012).
2     John Nagl, quoted in Julian E. Barnes, “Shrinking Budget Forces Army Into New Battlefield,”
The Wall Street Journal, May 10, 2013, p. 1.
3     Jack Midgley, “Building Partner Capability: Defining an Army Role in Future Small Wars,”
Small Wars Journal, February 20, 2012, at smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/building-partner-capability.
4     Ray Odierno, “The Force of Tomorrow,” Foreign Policy, February 4, 2013, www.foreignpolicy.
com/articles/2013/02/04/the_force_of_tomorrow.
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faces some hurdles in wielding strategic landpower in each of these
areas, yet not employing the Army will make matters worse.

Defense and Deterrence

This role is the most obvious one for the United States Army in
the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, resting as it does on military commitments since the 1950s. Most are familiar with the Army’s presence
on the Korean peninsula, fielding a force of several thousand to deter
large-scale North Korean aggression. The Army has deterred aggression in two ways: deterrence by punishment and deterrence by denial.
The first entails the promise of punishment so severe as to outweigh
any potential gains from aggression. American soldiers in South Korea
accomplish this by playing the role of a “tripwire” that would trigger a
larger response. Deterrence by denial—that is, preventing gains from
occurring—was more credible when American forces on the peninsula
were more numerous and deployed near the demilitarized zone. Today,
the Army is relocating farther south and handing over wartime operational control to the South Koreans starting in 2015. While the South
Korean military may continue to deter through denial, the US Army is
gradually becoming less critical to that mission.5 Indeed, several years
ago, US officials in South Korea stated that the future American role in
the defense of South Korea would be mainly an air force and naval role.6
Although not as obvious as the case of South Korea, the US Army
is also important to the defense of Japan, another critical treaty-based
American ally. Roughly 2,000 American soldiers based in Japan perform
vital theater enabling functions such as helping other US services fulfill
their missions in support of Japanese Self-Defense Forces.
Likewise, the Army provides critical support to the other services if
the United States were to become involved in responding to any Chinese
aggression toward Taiwan. The Mutual Defense Treaty between the
United States of America and the Republic of China was terminated
in 1980, and Washington maintains a policy of strategic ambiguity
regarding whether the United States would intervene in the event of a
mainland Chinese attack on Taiwan. Nonetheless, if mainland China
were to attack Taiwan and threaten vital American interests—including
the security of current US treaty allies in the region—the Department
of Defense would have to provide a range of options including military intervention. At a minimum, the US Army would bring to bear its
considerable combat support and sustainment capabilities in the IndoAsia-Pacific theater.
Aside from conventional scenarios involving the large-scale use of
landpower assets, other situations would entail the commitment of sizeable US Army forces. For instance, in the aftermath of a limited nuclear
exchange between Pakistan and India, the United States may be called
on to lead or conduct consequence management operations in one or

5     As evidence of this, the South Korea-based 8th US Army is transforming to becoming a
warfighting headquarters that could deploy to any area of the world to command and control
subordinate units.
6     Mark E. Manyin et al., “U.S.-South Korea Relations,” Congressional Research Service Report for
Congress, April 26, 2013, www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41481.pdf.
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both countries.7 The Army’s expertise in this area, and its ability to
command and control large-scale multiservice and multinational missions, make it indispensable for such a scenario. In another example, if
seismic activity in the South China Sea—for instance, along the Manila
trench, which scientists estimate is the locus of two or three earthquakes
of a magnitude 7.0 or greater every decade—caused a tsunami to inundate parts of the Philippines, the US Army would likely assist in disaster
relief operations.8
In addition, the US Army also provides niche capabilities to
strengthen regional defense and deterrence. The Army’s intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities are of particular value in
enabling the United States and its allies to achieve situational understanding and develop a common operating picture.
Along these lines, the Army also provides essential command,
control, and communications capabilities. Indeed, when it comes to
commanding and controlling large military operations with and among
Indo-Asia-Pacific countries, which may not be comfortable working
with each other, the US Army’s capabilities are unmatched. The Army’s
communications network supports all US military services in the theater
and enables operations within a noncontiguous battlefield framework,
spanning time and distance; thus, it enhances the lethality, survivability,
agility, and sustainability of US and allied forces.
Perhaps the most important capability the Army provides is ballistic
missile defense. Some have argued the Army ought to assume offensive
missile-related missions, such as coastal artillery, in the Pacific theater.9
According to this reasoning, the United States would seek to turn the
Anti-Access / Area Denial (A2AD) challenge posed by China on its
head, with US shore-to-ship coastal artillery batteries holding at risk the
growing Chinese navy and frustrating its ability to project power.
Although this makes great sense strategically, and would certainly
be seen as an Army mission, there are major drawbacks to pursuing this
course of action in the short run. It would require the development of
some capabilities the Army does not yet possess, such as the appropriate missiles, as well as the necessary doctrine, training, and manpower.
In the sequestration era, the Army may be hard-pressed to find the
resources necessary to take this on.
Nonetheless, other potential missions are possible today with little
in the way of materiel or doctrinal development. Ballistic missile defense
(BMD) of allied and partner countries is currently (and appears likely
to remain) a growth industry for the Army, especially in light of perceived Iranian and North Korean missile threats.10 The Army already
has the lead role in operating the road-mobile Patriot air defense missile
7     Michael O’Hanlon comments, “The U.S. Army in Asia: Opportunities and Challenges,” Center
for Naval Analyses Workshop (Arlington, Virginia, April 25, 2013).
8     Chiu Hon Chim, “Identifying Tsunami Risk in South China Sea,” lecture, University of
Hong Kong, April 23, 2007, www.slideshare.net/chius/identifying-tsunami-risk-in-south-china-sea.
For other scenarios like this that could entail the commitment of significant US Army forces, see
Nathan Freier et al., “Beyond the Last War: Balancing Ground Forces and Future Challenges Risk in
USCENTCOM and USPACOM,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 2013.
9     Jim Thomas, “Why the U.S. Army Needs Missiles,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2013.
10     The US Army currently operates the only system for strategic missile defense of the US
homeland—the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system—which protects against the
threat of limited intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) attack.
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system, which is designed to detect, intercept, and neutralize short-range
inbound ballistic missiles. The Army is also key to the Phased Adaptive
Approach to ballistic missile defense currently being developed for use
in Europe, the Persian Gulf, and the East Asia.11 For years, the Army has
operated an advanced X-band radar site in northern Japan near the town
of Shiriki; it may soon operate a similar radar site in southern Japan. If
the Aegis Ashore System planned for the European Phased Adaptive
Approach (EPAA) is replicated in other theaters, it is likely the Army
and Navy will revisit the issue of which service operates those facilities.
Currently, the Navy is slated to do so, but it seems likely the Army will,
and should, claim that mission at some point given that defense from the
land is inherently a landpower function.12
Additionally, the Army is the lead service for the Terminal High
Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system, which is completing its test
phase and entering operational service. The first operational THAAD
battery deployment occurred earlier this year to Guam in response to
heightened tensions on the Korean peninsula. It remains unclear to
some whether or how, politically speaking, the system could ever be
removed from Guam now that it has been deployed, even though the
Department of Defense is only planning for a 6-month extension of the
initial 90-day deployment.13
The Army’s embrace of the ballistic missile defense mission is
not without potential complications. The Defense Department faces a
demand for THAAD systems far outpacing supply, with virtually every
combatant commander requesting at least one and sometimes two, and
the Army continues to face BMD-related manpower challenges likely to
grow more difficult in an era of declining end strength.14
Nevertheless, America’s allies and partners in the Indo-Asia-Pacific
region are eager to host Army-operated ballistic missile defense systems
and US soldiers on their territory for two critical reasons.15 First, these
systems, when proven effective through rigorous, realistic testing, help
deter aggressors. Second, Army BMD systems assure US allies of the
American commitment, reduce the potential for political or other intimidation, and underwrite the promise of greater American involvement
should hostilities occur. Although not always viewed by the traditional
“maneuver tribes” within the Army—that is, infantry, armor, and artillery—as combat arms, and perhaps not always perceived as completely
11     In the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) for instance, the Army is responsible
for overseeing operation of AN/TPY-2 radar system in Turkey.
12     Steven J. Whitmore and John R. Deni, “NATO Missile Defense, EPAA, and the Army,”
Strategic Studies Institute monograph, forthcoming in fall 2013 (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies
Institute, 2013).
13     “First THAAD Deployment Is to Guam,” Mostly Missile Defense blog, April 3, 2013,
http://mostlymissiledefense.com; current plans call for acquiring six THAAD systems,
but the validated requirement is actually nine systems; Ken Quintanilla, "Argun Introduces
Resolution 186," KUAM News, July 8, 2013, www.kuam.com/story/22778740/2013/07/08/
arguon-introduces-resolution-186.
14     Steven J. Whitmore and John R. Deni, “NATO Missile Defense, EPAA, and the Army,”
Strategic Studies Institute monograph, forthcoming in summer 2013 (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic
Studies Institute, 2013); current plans call for acquiring six THAAD systems, but the validated
requirement is actually nine systems.
15     Although it addresses threat evolution and future trends, the latest draft of the Army’s Field
Manuel 3-27 on “Army Global Ballistic Missile Defense Operations,” somewhat ironically avoids any
mention of the growing interest among US allies and partners in hosting Army-operated ballistic
missile defense systems.
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equal, air and missile defense represents a vitally important mission set
for the Army in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region today, one that is very likely
to grow, if not because of Washington’s intent, then because US allies
and partners demand it.

Regional Security and Stability

When the US Army is not engaged directly in defense or deterrence,
its most important mission in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region is engaging in
security cooperation activities. Previously termed “mil-to-mil” activities,
security cooperation includes training events and exercises, senior leader
visits, educational programs, cooperative research and development, and
multilateral acquisition.
One example of these activities is the biennial Talisman Saber exercise with Australia. Conducted over the course of three weeks every
odd-numbered year since 2005, Talisman Saber involves tens of thousands of American and Australian troops taking part in combat training,
readiness, and interoperability exercises across a wide spectrum of
military activities. Events include amphibious assaults, parachute drops,
urban operations, and live-fire training. Another example is the “Yudh
Abhyas” exercise series between the Indian and US armies. Restarted
in 2004 following a 42-year lull, “Yudh Abhyas” has grown from relatively small annual exchanges focused on command post activities to
a much larger series of exercises involving hundreds of soldiers from
each country engaged in a peacekeeping exercise scenario. The annual
event rotates between India and the United States; in May 2013, roughly
400 Indian soldiers traveled to Ft. Bragg, North Carolina, to participate in Yudh Abhyas 2013. The two-week exercise also included expert
academic exchanges on logistics, engineering, information operations,
and chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives
(CBRNE). Across the region, and especially in Southeast Asia, there
is a growing interest among US partners and allies to engage in these
activities with American counterparts, and especially with the Army.16
Many security cooperation activities are conducted under the
auspices of the US State Department and its broad responsibility for
American foreign policy. In this context, Army security cooperation
activities truly are strategic in impact, directly advancing US foreign
policy. A military exercise with Australia, for example, benefits the
institutional Army insofar as interoperability is maintained with a critical ally through the development of common tactics, techniques, and
procedures. However, the benefits of such an event to the United States
and its allies and partners extend beyond the tactical. Security cooperation activities strengthen the capability of allies and partners to maintain
stability and security domestically as well as regionally. At the higher
end of the capability spectrum, the United States promotes the ability of
allies, such as Australia and India, to take increased roles in safeguarding
regional security and stability.17 Even among America’s closest, most
capable allies in the Indo-Asia-Pacific theater, plenty of room exists
for interoperability improvement, especially in terms of command and
16     Ernest Z. Bower and Duane Thiessen comments, “The U.S. Army in Asia: Opportunities and
Challenges,” Center for Naval Analyses Workshop (Arlington, Virginia, April 25, 2013).
17     Derek S. Reveron, Exporting Security: International Engagement, Security Cooperation, and the Changing
Face of the U.S. Military (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press: 2010), 31-33, 46-48.
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control interoperability, developing a common operating picture, and
avoiding blue-on-blue casualties.
For other partners, the United States helps establish capabilities that
support the rule of law, promotes security and stability domestically,
and ameliorates transnational security challenges such as international
criminals, smugglers, or terrorists.18 In the Indo-Asia-Pacific region,
which is vital to the US economy today, stability and security are essential to the flow of capital and goods and to continued economic growth.
Most of these missions could not be fulfilled by naval or air forces.
Certainly, air and naval exercises can build allied interoperability, or
foster the ability of less-capable partner militaries to interdict smugglers.
But air and naval forces cannot speak “army” to Indo-Asia-Pacific land
forces, which is critical given the dominance of land components across
the Indo-Asia-Pacific region.19 Seven of the 10 largest armies in the
world are in the Pacific theater, and 22 of the 27 countries in the region
have an army officer as chief of defense. Moreover, the Army has an
unmatched source of regional expertise—in the form of Foreign Area
Officers (FAOs)—that the other US military services have yet to replicate and which forms a critical enabler in Army security cooperation. In
sum, although it is not impossible to engage such counterpart institutions and officers without wearing Army green, such engagements are
undoubtedly easier and arguably more fruitful when it is Army to Army.
Despite the importance of security cooperation activities in the
Indo-Asia-Pacific region, several challenges threaten to undercut the
effectiveness of the Army’s efforts. First among these is the impact of
sequestration on operations and maintenance (O&M) accounts—which
fund exercises—and on the State Department’s foreign assistance
budget, which funds many of the train-and-equip programs implemented by the Army.20 Already in 2013, the US Defense Department
has scaled down training and exercise events for all military units except
those preparing for imminent deployment to Afghanistan. The Army’s
plans to send a battalion to Europe for six months in 2013 to participate
in NATO Response Force (NRF) training was downsized to a small
headquarters cell. The Pentagon is doing what it can to protect training
and engagement funds pegged for Southeast Asia, but it may only be
a matter of time before sequestration causes the United States to scale
down or eliminate Army participation in exercises and training events
across the Indo-Asia-Pacific region.21
Similarly, the Army continues to grapple with how it will shrink
from roughly 570,000 active-duty soldiers to 490,000, and possibly
lower if the path of sequestration remains unchanged. As Army end
strength declines, it will become increasingly difficult to generate the
forces necessary for a rigorous security cooperation program in the
18     For a discussion on how military forces contribute to addressing transnational security threats,
see Paul J. Smith, “Transnational Security Threats and State Survival: A Role for the Military?”
Parameters 30, no. 3 (Autumn 2000): 77-91.
19     Robert B. Brown and John E. Sterling comments, “The U.S. Army in Asia: Opportunities and
Challenges,” Center for Naval Analyses Workshop (Arlington, Virginia, April 25, 2013).
20     On the State Department’s FY 2014 budget submission, see www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
default/files/omb/budget/fy2014/assets/sta.pdf.
21     Ernest Z. Bower comments, “The U.S. Army in Asia: Opportunities and Challenges,” Center
for Naval Analyses Workshop (Arlington, Virginia, April 25, 2013).
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Indo-Asia-Pacific theater and elsewhere in a cost-effective way. The
Army appears to be focusing more of its existing manpower on security
cooperation in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region by having, for instance,
both I Corps in Washington state and the 25th Infantry Division in
Hawaii focus solely on the Pacific region instead of engaging in other
worldwide missions such as Afghanistan.22

Dealing with the Security Dilemma

The greatest challenge facing the United States today with regard to
rebalancing in the Pacific is to avoid provoking an escalation. The act of
rebalancing may so aggravate China as to spur it to behave more aggressively, undermining the very security and stability the rebalance effort
was designed to bolster in the first place. This is the classic security
dilemma—a situation in which one country’s efforts to strengthen its
security engenders a sense of insecurity among other countries. Some
of those other countries may subsequently take steps to bolster their
security, furthering the first country’s sense that it must do still more,
and an escalation, especially in the form of an arms race, ensues.
Among many observers, particularly those in China, the rebalance
appears to be a one-way ticket to great power rivalry with China.23 To
officials in Beijing, the Pacific pivot looks and sounds like the centerpiece of an American strategy to contain Chinese growth. Clearly, China
fears encirclement, and as a country with three contiguous neighbors
with which it has fought wars—India, Russia, and Vietnam—over the
last half century or so, those fears are not without some historical justification. Today, Beijing’s sense of being surrounded by hostile powers
becomes particularly acute when regional cooperation among even potential enemies, such as India and Japan, appears to be on the upswing.24 In
response, China’s leaders argue that, in fact, the Chinese benefit from
the existing order, and that China is actually a status quo power, not one
determined to upset the American-built order.
Of course, China’s neighbors do not necessarily share these perceptions. Beijing’s submission of its “nine-dash line” map to the United
Nations in 2009—designed to depict and hence justify the extent of
Chinese territorial claims in the South China Sea—caused dramatic,
negative reactions among other countries of the region. This development, as well as evidence of China wielding its economic power as a
political weapon, has spurred other countries to engage with the United
States, especially militarily.25 However, none wants to feel forced to
choose between one or the other, and many are now faced with questions

22     William Cole, “As Afghan Duty Winds Down, Army Adjusts Its Focus,” Honolulu StarAdvertiser, May 14, 2013.
23     He Yafei, “The Trust Deficit: How the U.S. ‘pivot’ to Asia looks from Beijing,” Foreign Policy, May
13, 2013, www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/05/13/how_china_sees_the_us_pivot_to_asia.
24     For example, see “Manmohan Singh to visit Japan to discuss security cooperation,” Hindustan
Times, November 2, 2012.
25     Keith Bradsher, “Amid Tension, China Blocks Vital Exports to Japan,” The New
York Times, September 22, 2010, www.nytimes.com/2010/09/23/business/global/23rare.
html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. Later, China reportedly ended the de facto ban on exports of rare earth
metals to Japan.
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over how to navigate between the rising economic giant and the one
country capable of acting as a security guarantor.26
The challenge facing senior American leaders is how to ensure vital
US interests, such as freedom of the seas, are maintained while also avoiding negative security dilemma outcomes. Such a task is difficult given the
degree to which Beijing views every American action in the Indo-AsiaPacific region as part of a broad anti-Chinese conspiracy. At a recent
conference on American policy toward Asia, former Undersecretary
of Defense for Policy Michèle Flournoy relayed one anecdote that
illustrates the challenge of changing Chinese perceptions.27 During a
meeting with her senior Chinese military counterparts, she presented
an historical analysis showing the distribution of US military forces and
the security agreements the United States had arrayed against the Soviet
Union at the height of the Cold War. She then showed the same types of
information vis-à-vis China, all dramatically less than the United States
used to contain the Soviet Union. In reaction, “their jaws hit the floor in
a moment of profound cognitive dissonance.” The Chinese officials said
they did not believe the data: it clashed heavily with what has become
conventional wisdom in China, even within elite circles.
If the United States is to have any chance of reshaping those closely
held Chinese perceptions, confidence- and security-building measures
will be critical. They permit two or more countries to exchange information regarding the size, composition, disposition, movement, or
use of their respective military forces and armaments, and to conduct
bi- or multilateral activities to verify that information. If constructed
and wielded successfully, they can help ensure normal military activities
are not mistakenly perceived as threatening, thereby ameliorating the
security dilemma.
The US Army has a strong record of success with such measures. Beginning with the intrusive on-site verification regime of the
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty approximately 25 years
ago, and continuing with inspection and verification measures under
the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty, the Vienna
Documents, and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Army
has decades of experience in building confidence through transparency
and hence furthering strategic American interests.28 Examples might
include notifications of troop movements and exercises; exchanges of
information on doctrine, strategy, unit locations, and defense budgets;
inviting observers to exercises and training events; facilitating independent technical verification means; exchanges of personnel at military
schoolhouses; establishment of “hotlines”; and multinational military
training such as for disaster relief or other humanitarian missions.

26     David J. Greene, “U.S. Strategy In Southeast Asia: Power Broker, Not Hegemon,” Joint Forces
Quarterly 64, 1st Quarter 2012: 131-133; Kenneth Lieberthal, “The American Pivot to Asia: Why
President Obama’s turn to the East is easier said than done,” Foreign Policy, December 21, 2011, www.
foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/12/21/the_american_pivot_to_asia?page=0,5; and Christian
Jack, “Australia’s strategic and economic position between Washington and Beijing,” East Asia Forum
blog, April 8, 2011, www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/04/08/18430/.
27     Michèle Flournoy comments, “The U.S. Army in Asia: Opportunities and Challenges,” Center
for Naval Analyses Workshop (Arlington, Virginia, April 25, 2013).
28     The Army FAO program played an important role once again, this time in facilitating the
development of confidence and trust.
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In limited cases, the Army and the other services are pursuing
some of the examples noted above. Since 2002, China has observed the
annual Cobra Gold exercise between the armies of the United States,
Thailand, and several Southeast Asian countries. For 2014, China has
accepted an offer by the US Navy to participate for the first time in
RIMPAC, the world’s largest maritime exercise event. China has also
joined the US Navy in counter-piracy training events. American critics
argue that Beijing’s participation in such activities only provides more
opportunities for Chinese military intelligence officers to collect information regarding American military techniques and procedures. In all
likelihood, this was also true in the Col War, with both Americans and
Soviets/Russians collecting intelligence on each other whenever and
wherever possible. However, at least in part, that is the point: to increase
transparency for all involved, and in so doing, to build confidence and
bolster security.
Aside from managing security risks in conducting such activities,
another challenge may be the lack of formal mechanisms for such measures. Those mentioned above were implemented under the terms of
binding treaties or other agreements, resulting in a formalized approach
with less reliance on ad hoc tools and mechanisms. Although formal treaties may be a bridge too far in the short run, the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) Regional Forum—which already has as one of
its objectives the development of “confidence-building and preventive
diplomacy”—and the ASEAN Defense Ministers Plus meetings may
provide the ideal venues for developing such measures between the US
Army, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and the armies of ASEAN
member states.

Conclusion

Conventional wisdom holds that the US Army’s primary role in the
Indo-Asia-Pacific theater is guarding against a North Korean invasion.
Arguably, the Army itself has promoted this over the last several years,
placing great emphasis on campaign planning on the Korean peninsula.
But such a conceptualization of how landpower is or could be utilized
in the pursuit of American vital interests is unnecessarily limited. The
strategic use of landpower in what is typically seen as a Naval or Air
Force theater offers more benefits to the national security of the United
States and its allies than is commonly acknowledged.
Defense and deterrence are critical roles the US Army plays on the
Korean peninsula, but the aperture needs to widen beyond discussing
potential responses to Pyongyang’s aggression. It is logical to expect the
Army to play a key role in any number of defense and deterrence related
scenarios—assuming sequestration does not force a precipitous drop
in Army end strength. This is especially true regarding ballistic missile
defense throughout the Indo-Asia-Pacific region and well beyond Korea.
At the same time, the Army will continue shaping the international
environment and preventing conflict, even though much of this mission
is fundamentally diplomatic in nature. The other US military services
cannot replicate Army-led security cooperation, especially in terms
of engaging with the armies of critical allies and partners like India,
Australia, Vietnam, and the Philippines. The US Army must overcome
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institutional as well as budgetary challenges to fulfill its missions
completely.
Finally, the Army can help the United States resolve the security
dilemma with China. It may take a generation or more to convince the
Chinese that the United States does not seek containment, and that US
mil-to-mil engagement throughout the region actually benefits China. It
is, however, an effort worth making.

